Proof of Theorem 4. For w a ∈ [c + c k , rc k w−c ], we have the boundary equilibrium. From its definition, y b (ξ) is decreasing in w a (that is,
Remaining Proofs:
Proof of Theorem 4. For w a ∈ [c + c k , dwa < 0). From Lemma 2 the optimal capacity K ap (ξ) is independent of w a . The total supply chain profit in the interior equilibrium is Π tot (y i (ξ), K ap (ξ), ξ) = E[r min(µ + ξ + , K ap (ξ)) − c max(y i (ξ), min(µ + ξ + , K ap (ξ)))] − c k K ap (ξ) and it is decreasing in y i (ξ) ( dΠ tot (y i (ξ),K ap (ξ),ξ) dy i (ξ) < 0). Hence dΠ tot (y i (ξ),K ap (ξ),ξ) dwa > 0.
For Part 2, note that the manufacturer's profit function in Equation (16) decreases uniformly in w a , hence it decreases at the equilibrium as well.
Part 3 follows from Parts 1 and 2 immediately since supplier's profit is the difference between the total profit and the manufacturer's profit.
For Part 4, we differentiate the equilibrium profit functions with respect to ξ. At the interior equilibrium, we have
Similarly, at the boundary equilibrium, we have
For Part 5, from Theorem 3 we know that an advance purchase contract with w a ∈ [w, w+ r−w w−c c k ] leads to the interior equilibrium and credible information sharing. The equilibrium profit under such
The first equality is due to w a ≥ w and the last inequality is due to the optimality of K ws (ξ), which maximizes
Proof of Theorem 5. To prove the first part, notice that when w a ≥ w, ∂Π m (y,K,ξ) ∂y < 0 both when K < y and K > y. Hence the manufacturer's profit function is always decreasing in y when w a ≥ w. So to induce an advance purchase the supplier should set w a < w. The proof of the second part is exactly the same as that of Lemma 2.
Knowing the supplier's optimal response, the manufacturer solves:
It is easy to verify that Π m (y, K ap , ξ) is concave and maximized at y is ≡ µ m + G −1 ( w−wa w ). Similarly, Π m (y, y, ξ) is concave and maximized at y b ≡ µ + ξ + G −1 ( r−wa r ). Hence we have the following 3 cases.
Proof of Theorem 6. It follows directly from the discussion prior to its statement in § 7.
Proof of Lemma 3. The manufacturer's and the supplier's expected profits are similar to
Equations (16) and (17) but in this case the manufacturer also pays τ E(K − max(D, y)) + to the supplier. Given these profit functions, the proof is similar to that of Lemma 2. 2
Proof of Theorem 7. From Lemma 3, a necessary condition is K τ (ξ) = K cs (ξ). This is satisfied by setting τ = (r−w)c k r−c−c k
. At an interior separating equilibrium, manufacturer's profit function
For this to be an equilibrium, the manufacturer's profit must be maximized at ξ = ξ. Thus the first order condition must hold atξ = ξ.
Since y τ (ξ) cannot be a constant in a separating equilibrium, it must be the case that
. With a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 3, we can verify that for w a ≥
is a separating equilibrium with the following belief: if the manufacturer orders y = y τ (ξ) for any ξ ∈ [ξ,ξ], then the supplier infers that the manufacturer's forecast information is ξ with probability 1. Similarly, the off-the-equilibrium belief is such that if the advance purcase is y < y τ (ξ)) then the supplier infers ξ with probability one; if the advance purchas is y > y τ (ξ)) then the supplier infers ξ with probability one.
Note that when w a = w and τ = (r−w)c k r−c−c k , the advance purchase quantity is y τ (ξ) = µ + ξ units.
Since this quantity is equal to the minimum demand when the forecast information is ξ, there is no risk of overproduction. The signal is costless, and we achieve channel coordination.
Note that in contrast to Theorem 3, a minimum advance purchase is not necessary in this case. To see the reason, consider the advance purchase with payback under symmetric forecast information. In the interior case, the manufacturer solves max y Π m (y, K cs (ξ), ξ). The first order condition is w(1 − G(y ps (ξ) − µ − ξ)) − w a + τ G(y τ s − µ − ξ) = 0. Hence the optimal advance purchase quantity under symmetric information is y τ s (ξ) ≡ µ + ξ + G −1 ( w−wa w−τ ). Note that the manufacturer with the lowest possible private forecast information ξ doesn't have any incentive to signal her forecast information (since the supplier knows that the forecast is at least ξ). Therefore when the information is asymmetric, the manufacturer can still chose to place the optimal advance order y τ s , but this is the same as the y τ (ξ). Therefore, the supplier does not need to impose any restriction on the manufacturer's advance purchase.
2
Proof of Theorem 8. To identify an optimal menu of contracts, the supplier solves a problem similar to the one in Equation (11), but now both the supplier's and manufacturer's profits are functions of (K(ξ), P (ξ), w(ξ), ξ). Using a similar argument as in Lemma 1, we can re-
. From this definition and the IC we have π m (ξ) = maxξ Π m (K(ξ), P (ξ), w(ξ), ξ). The envelope theorem implies that
To show that optimal wholesale price is independent of ξ, note that
Hence, for any ξ 1 > ξ 2 , it must be the case that w(ξ 1 ) = w(ξ 2 ). For otherwise, we have 0 =
, where the equality is due to IC; the second equality and the inequality are due to the sign of the second order derivatives. But this contradicts the optimality of w(ξ 2 ). Hence, the optimal w(ξ) does not depend on ξ. Using similar arguments as in the proof of Lemma 1, we reach an equivalent formulation
To maximize the above objective function, the supplier would first set w = r and eliminate the manufacturer's information rent, which is the second term. The remaining problem then is to choose a capacity level to maximize the total supply chain profit, that is to maximize Π tot (K(ξ), ξ).
The solution for this problem is to set K cr = K cs = µ + ξ + G −1 ( r−c−c k r−c ). The supplier's profit is exactly equal to the centralized system's profit. The manufacturer's optimal profit π m (ξ) = π m min . Hence, using Equation 8 and solving for the transfer payment, we obtain P cr = −π m min .
2.
Proof of Theorem 9 To prove Part 1, we define
,w+
as the supplier's profit as functions of w in the boundary equilibrium and interior equilibrium, respectively. In the boundary equilibrium, we have
is IFR, from Lemma 4 (provided later in this appendix), the profit function E[Π s (y b (ξ), y b (ξ), ξ)] is unimodal in w a . Therefore there exists a w * a such that π s (w) is increasing in w a for w a ≤ w * a and decreasing in w a for w a ≥ w * a . Hence the optimal w a = min( rc k w−c , w * a ). The result for the interior equilibrium follows from Theorem 4 Part 3, that is, the supplier's profit is increasing in the advance purchase price w a for each ξ. Therefore, E[Π s (y i (ξ), K ap (ξ), ξ)] is maximized at w a = w + (r−w)c k w−c . To prove Part 2, note that in the boundary equilibrium, the manufacturer orders only prior to capacity decision. Note also that if w ≤ rc k w * a +c, then the maximizer of the supplier's profit in the boundary equilibrium is attainable, that is min(
Hence w * a is feasible. To prove the convexity of supplier's profit at the interior equilibrium, we substitute the optimal
into π s i (w) and obtain
. (1) Note that in the above function, V (w) = max y (w − c)E[min( , y)] − c k y. By the envelope theorem, we have
, the optimal centralized supply chain profit, where Π cs (K, ξ) is defined in Equation (1) . The manufacturer's expected profit at the interior equilibrium is
which is equal to 0, when w = r. Therefore with w a = w = r, the supplier maximizes his profit to be equal to the centralized supply chain profit.
Part 3 follows immediately from Parts 1 and 2.
Omitted Results:
r ) is unimodal in w a Proof of Lemma 4 The proof of this Lemma uses exactly the same arguments used for a different problem setting inÖzer, Uncu and Wei (2003) . For completeness, we include the proof here. We define v ≡ G −1 ( r−wa r ). Hence, w a = r(1 − G(v)) and EΠ s (y b (ξ), y b (ξ), ξ) can equivalently be written as
Once we show this result, since v is monotone in w a , the profit function is also unimodal in w a .
Next we show that Π m (v) is unimodal in v. Letv o be the supremum of the set of points such
First, we prove thatv o is finite. Let t ∈ (0, b) and define the truncated random variable t on [t, b), whose cdf is
for all v ∈ [t, b). Note that t has a finite mean since has a finite mean. Note also that the failure rate of t is equal to the failure rate of for all v ∈ [t, b). Denote the failure rate of t with h t (·). Assume for a contradiction argument thatv o = ∞. t, b) . This implies that t is stochastically larger than a random variable η with a failure rate h η (v) = 1983) . Then, η has an infinite mean implying that t has an infinite mean, too. This contradicts the fact that t has finite mean. Therefore,v o must be finite.
This result implies thatv, the supremum of the set of points such that
For v ∈ (−∞, a), we have Theorem 10 For w a ≥ w, there exists a continuum of pooling equilibrium with advance purchase quantity y ∈ [0, y * ] where y * is defined in the proof. If the advance purchase is y ∈ [0, y * ], the supplier updates his prior belief to ξ and secures K ≡ K ws (ξ) units of component capacity. Otherwise, he cannot update his prior belief.
Proof of Theorem 10. In a pooling equilibrium, the supplier cannot update his belief hence, he determines the component capacity based on his prior belief about ξ. Given advance purchase z and capacity K, the supplier's expected profit is E ξ Π s (z, K, ξ) where Π s (z, K, ξ) is defined in Equation (17). A similar proof as in Lemma 2 shows that to maximize his profit, the supplier secures max(K wa , z) units of component capacity, where K wa is the same component capacity that the supplier would have built under the wholesale price contract. The best off-the-equilibrium belief to support such a pooling equilibrium is that the supplier believes the manufacturer's forecast information is ξ and builds capacity K if he observes any other advance purchase quantity y = z.
If the manufacturer with forecast information ξ were to deviate from the above pooling equilibrium, the best deviation can be determined as follows. Suppose the manufacturer choose advance
